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A NATIONAL RETIREMENT
INCOME POLICY: PROBLEMS AND
POLICY OPTIONS
Phyllis C. Borzi*
I think this is really an historic Labor Day-historic in
the sense that this legislation will probably give more
benefits and rights and success in the area of labor-man-
agement than almost anything in the history of this
country.
[I]t is indicative of the kind of cooperation that can be
achieved between labor and management. I know how
hard and how long many people in the labor movement
and management have worked to make sure that we
came up with the right kind of legislation.
[I]t is a good reflection on the relationship between the
executive branch on the one hand and the legislative
branch on the other. So, when you add it all up, even
though this is an extremely complicated piece of legisla-
tion, it has been the long labors of many, many people
that have produced the kind of result that is good for
America and, primarily, for those who will be the ulti-
mate beneficiaries of the legislation.
Remarks of President Gerald R. Ford
September 2, 19741
* Counsel for Pensions, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education and
Labor, Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations. B.A., 1968, Ladycliff College;
M.A., 1970, Syracuse University; J.D., 1978, Catholic University. The opinions expressed
in this Article are solely those of the author and not those of the Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, or the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations, or their
members.
1. Taken from the President's remarks at the bill signing ceremony in the White
House Rose Garden on Sept. 2, 1974. President Ford's Labor Day Message and his re-
marks upon signing the Act are reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WEL-
FARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY AcT oF 1974,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5321 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
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As members of Congress, congressional and agency staff, pri-
vate sector representatives of retirees, organized labor, the busi-
ness community, and the press gathered together on Labor Day,
1974 to watch President Gerald R. Ford sign H.R. 2, the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),2 they
had reason to be proud.
For over ten years Congress and the various Administrations'
had been concerned about the mounting losses of benefits to
workers covered by private pension plans. Members of Congress
had introduced bills, conducted investigations, and held hear-
ings to document the need for comprehensive pension reform.'
Yet because of the complex nature of the issues, the widely di-
vergent approaches to pension reform that had been advanced,
and the various turf battles that had been waged, many legisla-
tors thought that the consensus necessary to enact a bill was im-
possible to obtain.
Senator Jacob Javits, author of the first proposal for compre-
hensive pension reform,6 heralded the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) as "the greatest develop-
ment in the life of the American worker since social security.
' 7
Congressman John Dent, the original sponsor of H.R. 2, called
ERISA's passage the most important legislative battle he ever
fought.'
Even ERISA's most ardent defenders, however, recognized its
2. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18,
26, 29, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
3. On Mar. 28, 1962, President John F. Kennedy formed a special cabinet-level task
force, the Committee on Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private Retirement and
Welfare Programs, to review employee benefit programs. The Committee issued its re-
port in 1965, during the Johnson administration. For a full discussion of the evolution of
ERISA and the extent of involvement of the Johnson and Nixon administrations, see
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT IN-
COME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 1-25 (Comm. Print 1984) (essay of
Michael S. Gordon, Esq.) [hereinafter cited as SEN. AGING PRINT]. See also AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, THE DEBATE ON PRIVATE PENSIONS
7-10 (1968) [hereinafter cited as AEI].
4. Senator Jacob Javits's remarks on the Senate floor during the passage of the con-
ference report on H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), illustrated the types of loss that
had occurred. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4748-51.
5. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4747-48 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
Senator Javits introduced the first comprehensive pension and welfare plan reform bill
in 1967 as S. 1103, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., the Pension and Employee Benefit Act of 1967.
Senator Vance Hartke had introduced a pension reinsurance bill as early as 1964. The
bill was reintroduced in 1967 as S. 1635, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. For a detailed list of pro-
posed legislation predating ERISA, see AEI, supra note 3, at 8.
6. S. 1103, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
7. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4747.
8. Id. at 4667.
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limitations. For example, Congressman Dent was "not convinced
that the provisions contained in [the] conference report [were] a
penultimate solution to all the problems of retirement security
for our work force," and anticipated the need for future adjust-
ments.9 Nonetheless, Congress believed that in enacting ERISA
it had laid the foundation for the orderly and rational develop-
ment of a national retirement income policy, which had as its
ultimate goal assurance for each American worker of retirement
years free of economic anxiety. 10
Unfortunately, many believe that Congress has lost its way,
and that current concern with budget deficits has eclipsed the
goal of retirement income security. Virtually all segments of the
employee benefits community have demanded that a national
retirement income policy be developed and articulated; that
each legislative and regulatory proposal be measured against this
policy; that only those proposals that further our national retire-
ment income policy be adopted; and that retirement income se-
curity, not revenue-raising, be the focus of congressional debate.
Both organized labor and management have voiced identical
concerns. When Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, and
Richard Lesher, President of the United States Chamber of
Commerce, agree on something, people begin to pay attention.11
This Article examines the need for a national retirement in-
come policy, identifies the major components of such a policy,
and briefly discusses some of the policy options for private pen-
sion plans. This Article is an overview of several critical policy
areas. It is not an exhaustive policy analysis, nor does it provide
a definitive series of options for achievement of a particular pol-
icy. Its focus will be on the private pension system, rather than
on federally provided benefits such as social security or Medi-
care, or employer-provided pensions for state, local, or federal
employees. The issues discussed are a starting point for the type
of national debate that must accompany the development of
short- and long-term retirement security goals.
9. Id. at 4667-68.
10. For a discussion of subsequent legislation, see SEN. AGING PmIr, supra note 3, at
45-78 (essay of Dan M. McGill).
11. This unusual harmony is the result of both men's vigorous opposition to the pro-
posal to tax employee benefits. Their argument against taxing benefits stems from the
belief that such action would affect far more than tax policy. Encouraging the develop-
ment of employee benefit plans is part of a broad social policy, only part of which is tax-
oriented. See generally Kirkland, Don't Pick the Pockets of Workers, USA Today, Jan.
9, 1985, at 6A, col. 3; Lesher, It Makes No Sense to Destroy Benefits, USA Today, Jan.
9, 1985, at 6A, col. 6.
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I. THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY
Over the years, employer-provided pensions have developed as
supplements to social security. Private sector employers, as well
as governmental employers, have established employee benefit
plans for their employees. Initially, these programs arose
through the collective bargaining process and in response to the
needs of labor-management relations. Since the early 1920's,
however, Congress has encouraged the provision of employee
benefits through various tax incentives.12 Although it is true to-
day that many retirees can expect to receive pensions in addi-
tion to social security, it is equally true that not all retir-
ees-either today or in the future-will be so lucky. The
metaphorical "three-legged stool" of retirement income consist-
ing of social security, employer-provided pensions, and individ-
ual savings is well known. This stool, however, has never been
particularly sturdy or reliable. For most workers, some of its legs
are shorter than others and, for some workers, one or more of its
legs are missing. Still other workers have added a fourth leg:
post-retirement earnings.
A national retirement income security policy is needed to as-
sure that all of the legs of the stool exist and are pointing in the
same direction. Such a policy need not mandate that each
worker's stool be identical, but it should improve the chances
that most workers will have more than the single leg of social
security to rely upon when they retire.
Some have suggested, though, that a national policy is unnec-
essary. 3 They argue that each person can determine individually
what he or she needs for retirement and can plan accordingly.
Retirement income would consist of whatever savings or assets
had been accumulated during one's career, as well as any other
support family members would provide. This Darwinian ap-
proach, however, is unlikely to gain widespread approval. The
frailty of human nature, as well as economic necessity, causes
many individuals to reach retirement with little or no savings or
other means of support. If retirement income security were to-
tally dependent on individual efforts, some individuals would do
very well. Others, though, for reasons not entirely within their
12. Munnell, ERISA-The First Decade: Was the Legislation Consistent with Other
National Goals?, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 51, 53-55 (1985).
13. William A. Niskanen, a member of President Reagan's Council of Economic Ad-
visors, made such an observation at the ERISA 10th Anniversary Conference, held by
the Senate Special Committee on Aging on Sept. 11, 1984 in Washington, D.C.
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control, would have little or nothing to show for their lifetime of
work. Societal pressure causes the government to provide assis-
tance for the latter individuals." ' Taxpayers bear the cost of that
assistance; in the end, the cost of not having a national policy to
encourage employer-provided benefits might well be higher than
the costs of employer-provided benefits under the current sys-
tem of tax incentives.
Others have suggested that a national policy is essential be-
cause retirement income must consist of a mix of public and pri-
vate programs,15 as it does today."6 They argue that neither the
public sector nor the private sector can by itself provide ade-
quate retirement income. A national retirement income policy is
necessary because the respective roles and objectives of the pub-
lic and private sectors can only be developed, implemented, and
monitored on a national level.
The framers of ERISA certainly intended the statute to be a
concrete expression of national policy. Even with respect to pri-
vate sector employee benefit plans, though, ERISA was not a
complete statement of policy. Some issues, such as portability,
were simply not addressed. 17 Other issues, such as preemption
and the interface of the vesting rules with the antidiscrimination
rules, were addressed in ERISA but earmarked for further
study."8
More importantly, ERISA covers only a part of the universe of
employee benefit plans. Federal, state, and local plans (the so-
14. Of course, the current social security system provides far broader coverage and is
not generally means tested. Nearly all workers are covered by social security. The four
basic types of insurance benefits provided are old-age or disability benefits paid to the
worker, benefits for dependents of retired or disabled workers, benefits for surviving
family members of a deceased worker, and lump-sum death payments.
15. FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF
AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY (Feb. 26, 1981) [hereinafter cited
as PRES. COMM'N REP.].
16. In part, this mixture of public and private programs emerged because a signifi-
cant number of individuals were unable or unwilling to save enough to tide them over in
retirement. In part, however, it resulted from the inability of many families to care for
their aged members while assuring the family's own economic viability.
17. Congress, though, was concerned enough about portability to request that a study
be done about it. ERISA § 3022, 29 U.S.C. § 1222 (1982). Portability generally refers to
an employee's ability "to carry" earned benefits to the next employer. One of the reasons
that no system of portability has been developed to date is that two fundamental ques-
tions must first be answered: (1) what benefits should be portable (all accrued benefits
versus all vested benefits) and (2) should only benefit credits be transferred or should
plan assets follow these credits? For a fuller discussion of these and other policy issues,
see E. MEIER & P. BASSETT, PORTABILITY OF PENSION BENEFITS (Jan. 1981) (working paper
for the President's Commission on Pension Policy).
18. ERISA § 3022, 29 U.S.C. § 1222 (1982).
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called governmental plans) are exempt.'9 So are church plans20
and unfunded excess benefit plans. 2 ' Even if ERISA were to
cover these excluded plans, employer-provided benefits are only
one leg of the three-legged stool of retirement income. Social se-
curity and private savings also would have to be considered as
part of an overall policy.
To develop a meaningful retirement income policy, there must
be a national coordination of, planning for, and ongoing evalua-
tion of all the described programs, as well as of health and life
insurance plans, which are critical supplements to pensions.' In
addition, a national retirement income policy must factor in nu-
merous other programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid, employer-
provided welfare benefits,2 2 and other in-kind benefits.
A single administrative and regulatory structure in the execu-
tive branch is essential to the development of a rational and
comprehensive national policy. Although a number of legislators
have proposed a single agency to administer ERISA,25 no one
has introduced a bill that consolidates all the functions and du-
ties of the myriad governmental agencies administering all re-
tirement income security programs. Such a bill would be so far-
reaching that both its introduction and passage would be highly
unlikely. Yet, a national retirement income policy must cover all
of these programs to be fully effective.
In addition to the development of a single administrative and
regulatory structure in the executive branch, a single legislative
and oversight body must be created in the legislative branch. In
1981 the President's Commission on Pension Policy (the Carter
Commission) recommended the establishment of special com-
mittees on retirement income security in the House and Senate,
and the consolidation of jurisdictions of existing committees into
19. ERISA § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (1982).
20. ERISA § 4(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (1982).
21. ERISA § 4(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(5) (1982).
22. Welfare benefits are provided under an employee benefit plan and may include
health, disability, unemployment, vacation, training, day care, legal services, and scholar-
ship benefits. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982) defines a welfare benefit plan.
23. A single agency has been proposed several times since ERISA was enacted. H.R.
4340, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Mar. 2, 1977 by Congressmen John Dent (D-Pa.)
and John Erlenborn (R-11.)); H.R. 14138, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced on Sept. 20,
1978 by Congressmen Dent and Erlenborn); H.R. 6525, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced
Feb. 13, 1980 by Congressmen Frank Thompson, Jr. (D-N.J.) and Erlenborn); H.R. 4929,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced on Nov. 10, 1981 by Congressmen Erlenborn, Phillip
Burton (D-Cal.), Peter Peyser (D-N.Y.), and Thomas Petri (R-Wis.)); and H.R. 3339,




those special committees. 24 Although such an approach would go
a long way toward solving the problems caused by the lack of a
comprehensive approach to retirement income issues, the insti-
tutional jealousies among existing congressional committees are
likely to impede the adoption of this meritorious suggestion.
Short of the development of a single executive and legislative
structure, a national retirement income policy is nonetheless
within reach. A retirement income security policy can be devel-
oped, at least with respect to private employee benefit plans cov-
ered by ERISA and administered by the three ERISA agen-
cies.25 The four ERISA congressional committees, which are the
House Committees on Education and Labor and Ways and
Means and the Senate Committees on Labor and Human Re-
sources and Finance, could cooperatively set short- and long-
term retirement income goals. Their task would be to evaluate
the current situation, and to formulate goals and strategies for
reform. Although the committees' task would not be easy, it
would be critical to the development of an overall national pol-
icy. To be effective, the four committees would have to work to-
gether in the manner ERISA's framers contemplated when they
conceived the Joint Pension Task Force.
26
II. RETIREMENT ISSUES THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED BEFORE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL POLICY
Once Congress has recognized the need for a national retire-
ment income policy, it must address some threshold issues
before implementing a policy. In particular, Congress must de-
fine retirement, establish who will decide when it should occur,
and set retirement income goals.
A. Defining Retirement and Deciding When It Should Occur
Before establishing a national policy to assure adequate retire-
24. PRES. COMM'N REP., supra note 15, at 52.
25. The three agencies are the Departments of Labor and Treasury, and the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).
26. ERISA § 3021, 29 U.S.C. § 1221 (1982). Until 1981, the House Education and
Labor Committee had its own task force, the Task Force on Pension and Welfare Benefit
Plans, which was sometimes mistaken for the Joint Pension Task Force. Today, the Sub-
committee on Labor-Management Relations performs the functions of the House Pen-
sion Task Force.
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ment income, legislators must settle two fundamental issues:
what is retirement and when should it occur? The answers to
these questions are not as simple as they might appear.
To define what retirement is, Congress must decide whether
retirement should be a total withdrawal from the work force, or
whether some type of gradual or phased-in retirement is desir-
able. Part-time work, flexible scheduling, periodic sabbaticals,
and job sharing are some of the ways in which older workers can
continue employment without facing the traumatic experience of
traditional retirement: one day a full-time worker and the next a
person totally withdrawn from the work force.1
7
If the traditional theory of retirement is replaced by a more
flexible approach, changes to ERISA might be made in the areas
of suspension of benefits upon reemployment, 8 and hours of ser-
vice to recognize part-time work or job sharing. 9 In addition,
the elapsed time alternative for counting service deserves
reexamination. 0
In 1974, when Congress enacted ERISA, an employer could
require an employee to retire at age sixty-five. Retirement
27. S. RHINE, MANAGING OLDER WORKERS: COMPANY POLICIES AND ATTITUDES 4-5
(1984)(a research report from the Conference Board). Phased retirement was rare among
the companies the Conference Board surveyed: it was unavailable at 97% of them and
only one percent have a formal program of phased retirement. Two percent said that
gradual retirement could be arranged at the request of the employee.
28. See ERISA § 203(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a)(3)(B) ((1982). A plan may gener-
ally provide that benefit payments attributable to employer contributions may be sus-
pended if the retiree is reemployed by the same employer. In the case of a retiree receiv-
ing benefits under a multiemployer plan, the rules are more complicated. If the retiree
resumes work in the same industry, in the same trade or craft, and in the same geo-
graphic area covered by the plan under which benefit payments are being made, the
benefits generally may be suspended. The Department of Labor has issued regulations,
effective Jan. 1, 1982, concerning suspension of benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 2530.203-3 (1985).
29. ERISA § 203(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(2) (1982).
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.410(a)(7)(1980).
The general way to calculate an employee's service is based on the actual counting of
hours of service during a specified computation period. The elapsed time alternative for
counting service permits an employer to use equivalencies rather than count actual
hours. In other words, if a person is employed on the first day of a period ("employment
commencement date") and also on the last day of the period ("severance from service
date"), service would be counted by measuring the elapsed period, rather than the actual
number of hours worked during the period. Under the elapsed time alternative, there-
fore, it is possible for an employee who would have otherwise been entitled to a full year
of service credit under the normal rule (because the employee would have actually
worked more than 1000 hours in a 12-month period) to fail to receive a year of service
credit because he or she was not actually employed at the beginning and the end of a 12-
month period. Thus, employees working under plans in which the elapsed time alterna-
tive was used would have limited flexibility to adjust their employment to meet their
needs. If they were not actually employed on the first and last days of the measuring
period, they would not get credit for the year of service.
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meant a total withdrawal from one's position or occupation.
Federal law was reasonably consistent on this point. The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 31 permitted
mandatory retirement at sixty-five. Moreover, the age at which
unreduced social security benefits could begin for workers was
also sixty-five. It is not surprising, therefore, that ERISA gener-
ally allowed plans to treat age sixty-five as the normal retire-
ment age. 2
The provisions in ERISA permitting suspension of benefits
upon reemployment 3 and the social security earnings limita-
tion 4 discouraged workers from continuing employment beyond
the normal retirement age. Although the existence of these pro-
visions showed Congress's recognition that some workers might
not be willing or able to withdraw totally from the work force
when they retired from a particular job, the provisions them-
selves represented an implicit policy that at some point "retir-
ees" should not be receiving both wages and a pension.
At the same time that ERISA has continued to favor sixty-five
as the normal retirement age, two subsequent legislative changes
have called this policy into question. The 1978 Amendments to
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act raised the age of the
protected class to seventy.35 With relatively few exceptions, em-
ployers can no longer force employees to retire before age sev-
enty.36 In addition, a controversial amendment to the 1983 social
security financing legislation gradually extended the age for re-
ceipt of unreduced social security benefits from sixty-five to
31. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634).
32. See, e.g., ERISA § 206, 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (1982). But see 26 U.S.C. § 408(f) (1982)
(imposing the additional tax on early withdrawals if the individual is younger than 591/2).
Under ERISA, the concept of "normal retirement age" is important in establishing the
age at which an individual's benefits commence. Although plans could permit benefit
distributions early, no plan can prohibit benefit distribution once the worker reaches
normal retirement age under the plan. Furthermore, prior to that age, a vested employee
who has terminated employment, has no right to demand benefit payments unless the
plan so provides.
33. ERISA § 203(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(B) (1982); 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3)(B)
(1982).
34. Working beneficiaries under age 70, who earn income in excess of a specified
amount, forfeit benefits. Before 1983, 72 was the cut-off age. Social Security Amend-
ments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 114(c)(1), 97 Stat. 65, 79.
35. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189-90 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976)).
36. Sections 12(c) and (d) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 202, as amended by § 3(a) of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189, 189-90 (amend-
ing 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976)) are exceptions to that rule.
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sixty-seven. 7
Although the decision to retire is a personal one based on
many factors, perhaps the most significant one is economic.38 To
the extent that full retirement benefits under social security will
generally not be paid until age sixty-seven, workers who are
physically able will have a strong incentive to remain in the
work force until that age.
One policy issue, then, is whether ERISA should be amended
to conform with the decision made in 1983 to raise the retire-
ment age to sixty-seven. Those who believe that private pensions
and social security should move in tandem to avoid inadvertent
and conflicting results would argue for an amendment. On the
other hand, given the voluntary nature of the private pension
system, one might question whether consistency in this area is
essential.
Employers have traditionally used early retirement incentives
as a method to regulate their employment needs. Due to the na-
ture of their business, some companies want to retain older,
more experienced workers and, therefore, provide little incentive
for employees to retire early. Other employers depend on the
gradual replacement of older workers with younger ones, and
therefore provide generous early retirement benefits to facilitate
the transition. Notwithstanding the apparent federal trend to
encourage employees to work longer, most employees choose to
retire before age sixty-five.3 9
At least four policy options exist to deal with the inconsis-
37. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 210(a), 97 Stat. 65,
107-08. The age at which a retiree is entitled to full benefits will gradually be increased
to 67. Beginning with workers who reach age 62 in the year 2000, the age for receiving
full benefits will be increased by two months a year for six years. Thus, workers reaching
age 62 in 2005 will have to wait until age 66 for full benefits. For workers reaching age 62
in 2002, a similar phase-in will occur so that by 2027, the retirement age will be 67.
38. The Carter Commission identified three elements present in every retirement de-
cision: anticipated retirement income, health, and relationship of the worker to the job
(i.e., what is motivating the employee to ponder retirement: unemployment, mandatory
retirement, discrimination). See generally E. MEIER, EMPLOYMENT OF OLDER WORKERS:
DISINCENTmES AND INCENTIVES (Apr. 1980) (working paper for the President's Commis-
sion on Pension Policy).
. 39. The Conference Board recently released a study of the policies relating to older
workers of 363 companies in manufacturing, gas and electric utilities, insurance, banking,
and retail trade. The study examined retirement ages, practices and incentives related to
early/delayed retirement, and general company attitudes toward older workers. The sur-
vey found that the larger the company, the lower the average retirement age is likely to
be, although the average age of retirement for all companies surveyed was lower for most
companies than it was 12 years ago. This is not surprising because the Conference Board
found that the vast majority of firms are continuing to encourage earlier retirement
through various incentives. (See Chart 1 on next page.)
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tency between ERISA's reliance on sixty-five as the normal re-
tirement age and the other federal laws affecting retirement age.
First, Congress could leave ERISA as it is. Second, Congress
could conform ERISA to the Social Security Act by requiring
private pensions to use a normal retirement age corresponding
to that of social security. Third, Congress could conform ERISA
to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by requiring pri-
vate pensions to use seventy as their normal retirement age.
Fourth, Congress could amend ERISA to remove age sixty-five
as the normal retirement age, and permit employers to set their
own standards for normal retirement age.
The fourth option is the most desirable because of the volun-
tary nature of the private pension system and the varying needs
of both employees and employers. If Congress were to elect this
option, however, other amendments to ERISA would be neces-
sary. For instance, if a company chose to raise the normal retire-
ment age and thereby encourage employees to work longer, it
should be required to continue pension accruals and contribu-
tions on behalf of employees until they retire. In addition, em-
ployers should be required to adjust actuarially the benefit cal-
culated as of normal retirement age to reflect continued service,
or recalculate the normal retirement benefit to include salary in-
creases or benefit increases in effect during the post-normal re-
Chart 1
Average Age at Retirement in 1982, by Size of Company Work Force
Number of Percent of Companies
Employees 0 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
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tirement age periods of service."' Finally, the rule permitting
employers to exclude employees within five years of normal re-
tirement age would have to be reconsidered, particularly if the
vesting period were shortened.4'
In summary, two threshold policy decisions are necessary
before a national retirement income policy can be developed:
what is retirement and at what age should it begin? From both a
worker and employer perspective, ERISA should be neutral, en-
couraging neither working longer nor retiring earlier. Older
workers should be free to retire in the traditional way, or to re-
tire gradually. Plans could be structured to accommodate such
choices. Questions of plan design, including normal retirement
age, should be left in the hands of plan sponsors. ERISA might
be amended to provide an alternative set of requirements to be
40. The issue of whether employers are required to continue crediting service and
making contributions under ERISA for workers who continue in employment beyond the
normal retirement age under the plan has been a source of contention since Congress
passed the 1978 Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189. Although there is no specific language in ADEA that
spells out the relationship of that law to ERISA, or the right of an employer to refuse to
credit service between formal retirement age, usually 65, and age 70, the issue emerged
during the floor debate. Donald Elisburg, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Employment
Standards, assured members of Congress through a letter to the Senate Committee on
Human Resources, that the Secretary of Labor would not interpret ADEA as to require
crediting of service after normal retirement age. See 124 CONG. REc. 8218 (1978) (re-
marks of Sen. Williams). The Elisburg letter was followed by a Department of Labor
amendment to the Interpretative Bulletin on Employee Benefit Plans, 29 C.F.R.
§ 860.120(f)(2)(ii) (relating to the application of § 4(f)(22) of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)) to such plans). When the administration of ADEA was shifted from
the Department of Labor to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in
July of 1979, the EEOC announced that it intended to reexamine the issue. The EEOC,
though, backed down because of the swift and vociferous opposition of the Secretary of
Labor, as well as certain representatives of the business community and various mem-
bers of Congress who had been involved in the issue in 1978. The EEOC recently recon-
sidered the issue, and on June 24, 1984 announced that it intended to rescind the Labor
Department's interpretation allowing employers to freeze pension contributions and ac-
cruals for employees who work beyond age 65. On Mar. 5, 1985, the EEOC unanimously
approved proposed regulations rescinding those rules and announced that it will require
employers to continue crediting service and making pension contributions.
The regulatory process is, however, merely beginning. The proposed regulations must
be coordinated with other agencies, including the Labor Department and Internal Reve-
nue Service. The proposed regulations, together with regulatory impact analysis, must
then be forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval. After
OMB approves, the proposal will be published in the Federal Register, and a 60-day
public comment period will follow. Only upon completion of each of the foregoing steps
would the EEOC vote on finalizing the regulations, which would become effective on the
date they were published in the Federal Register in final form. Given these hurdles, most
people believe that absent legislation amending ERISA to require post-65 accruals, the
current rule will not be administratively overturned.
41. See ERISA § 202(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2) (1982).
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applied once the plan sponsor has made the decisions on these
threshold issues.
B. Setting Retirement Income Goals
One of the reasons that national planning to assure adequate
retirement income for workers and their dependents must be
undertaken is demographic. In 1980, approximately fifty-six mil-
lion Americans were in the sixty to seventy age group, with
about eighteen million older than seventy. By 2040, these num-
bers will more than double, rising to 118 million in the sixty to
seventy age group with fifty-four million above seventy."
The effect of such a shift in our population on the social se-
curity system and employer-provided pensions could be stagger-
ing. The Social Security Administration projects that the num-
ber of Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
beneficiaries will be seventy-eight million by the year 2040. Peo-
ple older than sixty will represent twenty-six percent of the total
population.1
3
The increase in the percentage of the total population over
age sixty raises the question of how an increasing number of re-
tirees will be supported. Before one can determine how to sup-
port them, though, an adequate retirement income for them
must be defined. Defining an adequate retirement income in-
volves two considerations: what would be adequate at retirement
42. D. KOITZ, VARIOUS EFFECTS OF RAISING THE NORMAL RETIREMENT AGE FOR SOCIAL
SECURITY BENEFITS 54 (Table 13) (July 10, 1984) (Congressional Research Service, Li-
brary of Congress).
TABLE 13
Long-Range Projections of Aged Population
Age Groups
Year 60+ 60-64 65-69 70+
(Persons in millions)a
1980 37 10 9 18
2000 47 11 9 27
2020 73 20 17 36
2040 86 17 15 54
a. Rounded to nearest million.
Source: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, SOCIAL
SECURITY AREA POPULATIONS PROJECTIONS, ACTUARIAL STUDY No. 88, Tables 16e,
18e, 18f (1983).
43. Id. at 53 (See Table 12 on next page).
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and what would be necessary to maintain adequacy during re-
tirement? The task of defining an adequate retirement income
has inspired a considerable amount of research and discussion
over the past ten years, and some basic policy assumptions have
emerged.
1. Adequate income at retirement- In determining ade-
quacy, the appropriate measure should be the maintenance of
preretirement standards of living. Most policyrnakers agree that
an adequate level of income in retirement is one that does not
cause a person's lifestyle to deteriorate markedly from that indi-
vidual's preretirement level.44 This principle is normally ex-
pressed in a replacement ratio that varies according to income
level. Many factors are considered in calculating this ratio, in-
cluding tax liabilities, both before and after retirement.46
In 1981, the Carter Commission discussed the question of re-
tirement income objectives, although it did not recommend a
particular set of goals. The Commission did note that "[blecause
of changes in consumption patterns, tax liabilities and savings
rates, the income that needs to be replaced in retirement is less
than 100% of preretirement earnings."'46 The Commission illus-
trated various replacement ratios that might be necessary to
maintain a preretirement standard of living. The average range
was from seventy-nine percent for the minimum-wage earner to
fifty-one percent for the highest earner.4 7 These ranges are a rea-
sonable baseline for policymakers to use in trying to develop re-
TABLE 12
Basic Long-Range Demographic Assumptions
Populationa OASDI Beneficiaries
b
Year Total Age 60 and older OASI DI
(% of total)
(Persons in millions)c
1980 236 37 (16%) 30 5
2000 277 47 (17%) 40 5
2020 308 73 (24%) 57 7
2040 325 86 (26%) 71 7
a. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF THE ACTARY, SOCIAL SE-
CURITY AREA POPULATIONS PROJECTIONS, ACTUARIAL STUDY No. 88,
Tables 16e, 18d, 18e, 18f (1983).
b. From THE 1983 OASDI TRUSTEES' REPORT 75.
c. Rounded to nearest million.
44. See generally E. MEIER, C. DITrMAR & B. TORREY, RETIREMENT INCOME GOALS 1-
11 (Mar. 1980) (working paper for the President's Commission on Pension Policy).
45. Id.
46. PRES. COMM'N REP., supra note 15, at 42.
47. Id.
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tirement income goals.
Because a fundamental assumption underlying the develop-
ment of a national retirement income policy is that social secu-
rity should provide a floor of retirement income, it is necessary
to examine what portion of total retirement income social secur-
ity is likely to provide both to current and future retirees. For
workers retiring today at sixty-seven4" the ultimate long-range
replacement rates for social security vary from 54.1% for low,
40.7% for average, and 27.2% for high wage-earners. 9
Thus, subtracting from the total replacement rate goals the
actual social security replacement rates should yield a figure
equal to the amount of preretirement income that must be re-
placed by sources of income supplementing social security. For
example, a minimum-wage worker might have a replacement
rate goal of eighty percent. At sixty-seven, social security would
replace about fifty-four percent. That worker would need income
from other sources equal to twenty-six percent of preretirement
income to meet his or her retirement income goal. Similarly, a
worker who always earned at least as much as the maximum
earnings taxable for social security purposes ($39,600 in 1985)
might have as a total replacement rate goal fifty percent of pre-
retirement earnings. Because social security would replace only
48. Beginning in 2027, 67 will be the age at which unreduced social security benefits
are payable.
49. D. Korrz, supra note 42, at 21 (Table 5).
TABLE 5
Social Security Replacement Rates: The Impact of
Raising the Normal Retirement Age to 67
Ultimate long-range replacement ratesa
Low Earnerb Average Earnerc Maximum Earnerd
Age of
Retiree Old Law New Law Old Law New Law Old Law New Law
62 45.7% 40.0% 34.2% 29.9% 23.0% 20.1%
65 55.1 47.8 41.3 35.8 27.7 24.0
66 56.2 51.0 42.2 38.3 28.2 25.6
67 57.3 54.1 43.1 40.7 28.8 27.2
70 61.0 65.7 46.2 49.8 30.6 33.0
a. Defined as benefits in the first year of entitlement over earnings in the final year
of work.
b. Defined here as someone who always earned the Federal minimum wage.
c. Defined here as someone who always earned an amount equal to the average
wage used for social security indexing purposes.
d. Defined here as someone who always earned an amount equal to the maximum
earnings taxable for social security purposes (e.g., $37,000 in 1984).
Source: Developed using unpublished tables prepared by Orlo Nichols, Office of the
Actuary, Social Security Administration (Nov. 17, 1983).
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twenty-seven percent; the worker would need twenty-three per-
cent of preretirement income from other sources to meet his or
her goal.
Once retirement income goals have been set, the next step is
to examine sources of retirement income. Although the Carter
Commission did a great deal of work on this topic,50 the 1982
New Beneficiary Survey (NBS), conducted by the Social Secu-
rity Administration, contains the most recent data on retirement
income. The sample represents beneficiaries first entering pay
status during the twelve months extending from mid-1980 to
mid-1981. In their recent Article analyzing the results of the
NBS, Linda Drazga Maxfield and Virginia P. Reno discuss the
main components of retirement income supplementing social se-
curity, which are employer-provided pensions, income from sav-
ings and assets accumulated before retirement, and post-retire-
ment earnings."
According to Maxfield and Reno, fifty-three percent of mar-
ried men received pension income-either private or governmen-
tal-as did forty-two percent of the unmarried workers.52 About
seven percent of the couples had pension income earned by both
spouses,5 3 although female spouses were unlikely to have pension
income earned on their own." Eighty-four percent of the couples
received asset income 55 as did seventy-three percent of the un-
married female workers and sixty-three percent of the unmar-
ried male workers.56
Perhaps the most surprising finding was the large number of
retired workers with continued income from employment.
Twenty-seven percent of the unmarried workers and forty-four
percent of the married reported income from this source. Hus-
bands and wives were equally likely to be earning post-retire-
ment income-approximately twenty-seven percent of each
group reported earnings.5
Although the NBS found a relatively high incidence of supple-
50. See generally E. MEIER & C. DITTMAR, INCOME OF THE RETIRED: LEVELS AND
SOURCES (Oct. 1980) (working paper for the President's Commission on Pension Policy).
51. Maxfield & Reno, Distribution of Income Sources of Recent Retirees: Findings
From the New Beneficiary Survey, 48 Soc. SEcuRITY BULL., Jan. 1985, 7-13.
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id. at 11.
54. Id. at 9. Only 10% of the female spouses had pension income earned on their
own.
55. Examples of asset income are interest on savings accounts, money market ac-
counts, certificates of deposit, and checking accounts.




mentation of social security benefits, the amounts of income
from those sources were relatively low. Half the married workers
and one-fourth of the unmarried either had no additional in-
come or additional income of less than $100 per month."
2. Maintenance of adequate retirement income- Even if re-
tirement income is adequate when a worker retires, maintaining
adequacy throughout the retirement years is difficult. Some
sources of retirement income, though, are subject to cost-of-liv-
ing adjustments (COLAs). Social security benefits, for example,
are indexed for inflation. 9 Automatic cost-of-living increases are
effective in any year after the Consumer Price Index has risen
three percent or more between specified periods.60 Maintenance
of adequacy is thereby accomplished for social security recipi-
ents. Private pensions, however, rarely provide automatic
COLAs, although some grant ad hoc adjustments.6" Thus, a ma-
jor problem facing Congress in developing a national retirement
income policy is how to assure that a worker covered by a pri-
vate pension has an adequate retirement income throughout the
worker's retirement years. In the future, maintenance of ade-
quate retirement income is likely to become more important and
expensive because increases in longevity are likely to continue."
58. Id. at 12.
59. State pension systems generally have a COLA feature, with most providing auto-
matic full inflation protection up to a ceiling averaging between two and five percent.
HOUSE COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, DESIGNING A RETIREMENT SYSTEM FOR
FEDERAL WORKERS COVERED BY SOCIAL SECuRITY, H.R. Doc. No. 17, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
62-63 (1984) [hereinafter cited as POST OFFICE & CIVIL SERVICE REP.]. One of the most
controversial features of the Civil Service Retirement System is its automatic full COLA.
Id. at 8.
60. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 112, 97 Stat. 65, 73-76.
61. For a description of the COLA practices of private pension plans, see POST OF-
FICE & CIVIL SERVICE REP. supra note 59, at 47, 236.
62. D. KoITz, supra note 42, at 57 (See Table 16 on next page).
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ERISA does not require plans to provide COLAs for retirees.63
As desirable as that income protection might be, however, it
would be quite costly, at least judging from the costs to the Civil
Service Retirement System of such a feature.6 4 For political rea-
sons, it is unlikely that Congress would mandate such costs, par-
ticularly in light of the many other higher priority areas for in-
creased employer spending.6 "
III. DESIRABLE FEATURES OF PENSION PLAN POLICY
After Congress has decided to formulate a national retirement
income policy and addressed the important threshold retirement
issues discussed in Part II, it must define some of the problems
the policy will address. Specifically, it should consider how to
TABLE 16
Long-Range Projections of Changes in Life Expectancy
Life Expectancy
a
Year At Birth At Age 65
Male Female Male Female
1940 60.9 65.3 11.9 13.4
1960 66.6 73.2 12.9 15.9
1980 69.8 77.5 14.0 18.3
Projections:
2000 73.4 81.0 15.7 20.8
2020 74.4 82.2 16.4 21.7
2040 75.4 83.3 17.2 22.6
2060 76.3 84.4 17.9 23.6
a. The life expectancy for any year is the average number of years of life remaining
to a person if that person were to experience the death rates by age observed in, or
assumed for, the selected year.
Source: THE 1983 OASDI TRusTEEs' REPORT 40.
63. Alicia Munnell, Senior Vice President and Director of Research at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, has raised questions with respect to the effect of inflation on
vested benefits. In the past, she has advocated some form of indexing of vested benefits
for employees who terminate employment before retirement age. For a discussion of this
issue, see Munnell, supra note 12, at 65-68.
64. The Congressional Research Service estimates that this indexing feature alone
costs the Civil Service Retirement System 11.5% of payroll. POST OFFICE & CIWL SER-
VICE REP., supra note 59, at 12 (Table 1-1).
65. For example, Congress would most likely mandate shorter vesting periods, estab-
lish some type of a minimum retirement benefit for all workers, and require all service to
be aggregated for purposes of determining the right to and amount of a benefit (disre-
garding all breaks in service regardless of length) before it would require employers to
provide pension COLAs.
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increase pension coverage, increase eligibility for plan participa-
tion, treat vesting requirements, and formulate a portability
system.
A. Increasing Pension Coverage
The most common supplement to social security is an em-
ployer-provided pension. According to the Carter Commission,
coverage under pension plans varies widely according to the cat-
egory of workers. Ninety-one percent of federal workers between
twenty-five and sixty-four, and eighty-three percent of state and
local workers in the same age group are covered by a plan.e6 A
significantly lower coverage rate of fifty-four percent exists
among private sector workers.67 Because coverage issues related
to governmental plans are beyond the scope of this Article, this
section will focus only on coverage under private pension plans.
The most serious problem confronting policymakers in their
efforts to assure an adequate retirement income is the stagna-
tion of coverage. Between 1940 and 1960, pension coverage of
nongovernmental nonagricultural workers rose from 14.5% to
40.8%, but between 1960 and 1970 only about 4% growth oc-
curred e.6  Because coverage rates as of May 1983 were about
56% ,69 as compared to 52 % in 1979,'70 the rate of growth appears
to have leveled off.
One goal of a national retirement income policy would cer-
tainly be the increase of worker coverage under private pension
plans. In fact, a national policy goal ought to be the coverage of
every worker under the private pension system and the guaran-
tee of benefits under an employer-provided plan as a supple-
ment to social security. This would assure the existence of at
least two legs of the retirement income stool. Before developing
policy options to reach that goal, however, policymakers must
identify the characteristics of workers not currently covered
under private pension plans, and determine why those workers
are not covered.
71
66. PRES. COMM'N RaP., supra note 15, at 27 (Table 11).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 12 (Table 1).
69. Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief, New Survey Findings on Pen-
sion Coverage and Benefit Entitlement, Aug. 1984, at 5 (Table 1) [hereinafter cited as
New Survey Findings].
70. PREs. COMM'N REP., supra note 15, at 13 (Table 2).
71. Because this is such a critical issue, the Employee Benefit Research Institute
(EBRI), in conjunction with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
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Two ways exist to identify the characteristics of the noncov-
ered work force. One focuses on the characteristics of employers
without pension plans, the other on the characteristics of non-
covered individuals.
Looking first at employers, the three most accurate predictors
of pension coverage are the size of the firm, its union status, and
the industry of which it is a part. Only 22.9% of workers in firms
with less than 100 employees are covered by pension plans, while
81.5% of workers in firms with 500 or more workers are cov-
ered.72 Moreover, 81.6% of all unionized workers are covered, in
contrast to 44.4% of nonunion workers. 73 Finally, 69% of manu-
facturing workers are covered, while only 43.6% of nonmanufac-
turing workers are.
7'
Turning to the characteristics of workers, the primary factors
that determine the likelihood of coverage include age, 75 earn-
ings 7 6 sex,7 job tenure, 8 and number of hours worked.79 In ad-
dition, two types of workers are highly unlikely to be covered
under pension plans: the self-employed and agricultural
workers.
8 0
In summary, the workers least likely to be covered under a
pension plan are those who are young, work for a small nonun-
ion company of fewer than 100 employees, and earn less than
$10,000 a year. In addition, workers who do not meet ERISA's
sponsored a special supplement to the MAY 1983 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS)
conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Dr. Emily S. Andrews discusses the find-
ings in a new book. E. ANDREWS, THE CHANGING PROFILE OF PENSIONS IN AMERICA (1985).
72. Id. at 49 (Table 111.1).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 64.6 % of all employed individuals under age 25 are not covered by a pension plan
and 64.9% of all employed workers over 65 are not covered. Id. at 72 (Table IV.1).
76. 37.5% of all employed individuals earning between $5,000 and $9,999 are covered;
57.9% of those earning between $10,000 and $14,999 are covered; 71.9% of those earning
between $15,000 and $19,999 are covered; and approximately 80% or more of the work-
ers earning above $20,000 are covered. Id. at 52 (Table 111.2).
77. Sex appears to be decreasing in importance as a determining factor in coverage.
In 1979, 39.1% of the covered work force were women, whereas in 1983 they were 42.9%
of the covered work force. Id. at 63 (Table 111.8).
78. 29.4% of those on the job for less than one year are covered; 56.2% of those who
worked between one to nine years are covered; and 79.6% of those on the job for 10
years or more are covered. Id. at 49 (Table III.1).
79. 27.5% of those working less than 1000 hours are covered; 50.5% of those working
between 1000 and 1999 hours are covered; and 64.5% of those working 2000 or more
hours are covered. Id.
80. Eighty percent of the self-employed enjoy no pension coverage, either through a




participation standards, 81 are unlikely to be covered. Therefore,
such workers could be excluded from coverage even if their em-
ployers offered a pension plan. Nevertheless, about one-third of
the currently noncovered workers would have to be included in a
plan if their employer offered one, because they already meet
ERISA's minimum participation standards.8 2
A national retirement income policy with a goal of increasing
coverage faces two clear tasks: expanding coverage by encourag-
ing employers without pension plans to establish them, and ex-
panding coverage by changing ERISA's participation rules. Each
of these tasks is formidable.
Before trying to fashion a way to expand coverage among em-
ployers without pension plans, one must first examine why these
companies have no plans. Although little reliable statistical evi-
dence exists on this issue, anecdotal evidence suggests at least
three reasons why employers do not establish pension plans.
First, pension plans cost money. Not only must the employer
generally contribute on a regular basis, he or she must also bear
both the initial cost of instituting a plan and the ongoing costs
of its administration. Because of economies of scale, small com-
panies pay a disproportionate amount in administrative ex-
penses, and such administrative cost is a major disincentive to
plan formation. Many small companies have little or no profits,
or even any extra cash, from which to absorb these costs. In ad-
dition, if the employer does have some extra money, health in-
surance rather than pensions is the first employee benefit pro-
vided. Finally, most small business owners would rather reinvest
profits in the company than provide a pension plan. Later, the
sale of the business will provide the owner with retirement in-
come, while employees may have no retirement benefits to show
for their work.
Second, pension plans are burdensome. If an employer self-
administers the plan, there are reporting requirements" and fi-
duciary rules.8 4 If the plan is a defined benefit plan, an actuary
must be hired,8 5 plan termination insurance premiums paid to
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation," and additional
rules followed. Even if the employer hires someone to administer
81. Examples of workers who do not meet ERISA's participation standards are those
without one year of service, or who do not work 1000 hours a year.
82. E. ANDREWS, supra note 71, at 72 (Table IV.1).
83. ERISA § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (1982).
84. ERISA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
85. ERISA § 103(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(d) (1982).
86. ERISA § 4007, 29 U.S.C. § 1307 (1982).
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the plan, he or she still retains a duty to supervise the plan's
administration. Although many argue that the actual burden of
the plan is small compared to the benefit to both the employees
and the employer, the belief that pension plans are burdensome
persists, and it is a disincentive to plan formation.
Third, pension plans are sold, not bought. Conversations with
both small business owners and their advisors reveal that estab-
lishing a pension plan is the farthest thing from their minds.
Running their businesses consumes all of their energy, and they
do not have time to ponder pension plans. If an insurance agent
or someone they know, such as an employee, approaches them
about establishing a plan and convinces them that it is afford-
able and not unduly burdensome, they might agree. They, how-
ever, are unlikely to seek out someone to establish a plan.
The number of employers who have pension plans can be in-
creased in two ways. One is to mandate the existence of pension
plans. The other is to provide incentives for employers to estab-
lish plans voluntarily.
The Carter Commission proposed a mandatory private pen-
sion system as a second tier to social security.87 The Commission
recommended that a Minimum Universal Pension System
(MUPS) be established for all workers, funded by employer con-
tributions equal to three percent of pay. Although participation
was to be limited to employees over age twenty-five with one
year of service who had worked at least 1000 hours, 8 vesting was
immediate. The Commission recommended that the program be
phased in over a three-year period, and that a special tax credit
be given to small employers to ease the costs.8 9 Not surprisingly,
the reaction of the business community to the proposal was gen-
erally negative, that of participant and retiree groups generally
positive.
Requiring all employers to provide pension coverage for their
employees would achieve the goal of expanding coverage. It
would require, however, a reversal of our longstanding policy of
a voluntary private pension system. It is unlikely that Congress
is ready to take that step. Some form of a mandatory pension
system may occur, though, at least for some workers, if volun-
tary incentives fall substantially short of the goal of full
coverage.
87. PRES. COMM'N REP., supra note 15, at 42-44.
88. The Carter Commission's proposed participation standards were equivalent to
ERISA's standards at the time of the Commission's proposal.
89. PRES. COMM'N REP., supra note 15, at 42-44.
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Designing incentives to increase coverage is a much harder
task conceptually than mandating the existence of pension
plans. In the past, Congress has considered various tax incen-
tives.90 Based on what we know about which employers do not
have plans and why they do not, however, it is not clear that tax
incentives will work. Many of the employers without plans are
small, marginal companies. Many of them are not profitable
enough to pay taxes. The debate, therefore, over whether a tax
credit or a tax deduction is a greater incentive is irrelevant. 91
Unless a refundable tax credit is used as an incentive, tax incen-
tives alone will probably not increase coverage significantly. In
addition, if Congress moves forward on a tax simplification plan,
corporate tax rates are likely to be even lower than they cur-
rently are. The usefulness of tax incentives diminishes as margi-
nal tax rates decrease.
Thus, Congress must look to other types of incentives to in-
crease coverage. In the past, some effort has been made to pro-
vide pension plans that are simple to adopt and administer, such
as the master and prototype plans9 2 the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice developed, the Simplified Employee Plan (SEP),9 3 and em-
90. For example, S. 3017, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., introduced by Senator Jacob Javits in
1978, provided for a special declining tax credit, in addition to the normal tax deductible
contributions, for five years for small employers setting up new qualified pension plans.
The credit was equal to five percent of the normal deductible contributions in the first
year, three percent in the second and third years, and one percent in the fourth and fifth
years. In addition, any employer who improved a plan to provide for significantly more
liberal eligibility standards than ERISA required, such as faster vesting and earlier par-
ticipation, would also get a five percent tax credit. A similar provision appeared in S.
209, the Williams/Javits bill, introduced in 1979. H.R. 3396, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., intro-
duced by Congressman Claude Pepper (D-Fla.) on May 1, 1981, took another approach.
That bill would have authorized an additional tax credit equal to six percent of the al-
lowable deductions for plan contributions under § 404 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Alternatively, an employer could take a 46% tax credit in lieu of the normal deduction.
In addition, H.R. 3395, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), also introduced by Congressman
Pepper, would have authorized a 50% refundable tax credit for retirement savings, ei-
ther through an IRA or a voluntary plan contribution.
91. The Carter Commission recommended exploring the use of tax credits to en-
courage low- and moderate-income workers to save for retirement. See THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, FIRST INTERIM REPORT 21 (May 23, 1980).
92. Both master and prototype plans are authorized by the Internal Revenue Service
under Rev. Proc. 84-23, 1984-1 C.B. 457. Under a "master plan," a sponsoring organiza-
tion makes available for adoption by employers a plan for which a single funding me-
dium (usually a master trust) is established for the joint use of all contributing employ-
ers. Under a "prototype plan," a sponsoring organization makes available for adoption by
employers a plan under which a separate funding medium is established for each con-
tributing employer. Financial institutions are usually the sponsoring organizations for
master or prototype plans.
93. 26 U.S.C. § 408(k) (1982).
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ployer-sponsored IRAs.94 Yet none of these simplified ap-
proaches seem to have caught on in numbers sufficient to
increase coverage significantly.95
Part of the reason why employers have not used these simpli-
fied approaches is that plans are sold rather than bought. Who
has marketed the SEP or the master/prototype plans? Certainly
not the IRS. Certainly not Congress. Certainly not the insurance
companies. And certainly not the largest of the growth indus-
tries, employee benefit consulting firms, which provide actuarial
services for defined benefit plans.
If coverage is to be increased, someone must market a simple,
readily available, and relatively inexpensive pension plan. Such
a plan would most likely be a defined contribution plan,96 but
one that is a retirement plan, rather than a mere capital ac-
cumulation plan. It could combine the ease of a SEP with the
salary reduction feature of a cash or deferred plan under section
401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code.97 In that way, employers
would not have to contribute to the plan, but could match em-
ployee contributions if they so desired. Given the popularity of
section 401(k) plans today, employees themselves might market
these plans to their employer. In addition, if the financial insti-
tutions could be convinced that these plans would represent a
new source of funds, they might market them as aggressively as
IRAs.
Alternatively, Congress might decide to create a new type of
defined benefit plan structured much like current multiemployer
plans, but with a few important differences. First, any employer
could join the plan, regardless of whether the employer's partici-
pation was the result of collective bargaining. Second, an inde-
pendent fiduciary, probably a financial institution, would admin-
ister the plan. Third, employers would buy a particular level of
benefits, and benefit increases would only occur when the em-
ployer chose to upgrade its benefit levels through higher contri-
94. 26 U.S.C. § 408(c) (1982).
95. But see Baum, Small Firms Opt for Quick, Easy Retirement Plan, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 12, 1985, at 33, col. 2.
96. Defined contribution plans are relatively simple to establish because individual
accounts are set up for each participant and the employer contributes a fixed amount to
each account on a specified basis. These plans are easy to administer and easy to com-
municate to employees. In addition, the annual cost to an employer is known in advance
and therefore can be taken into account as part of normal business planning. Finally, the
cost to an employer beyond the predetermined contribution rate is minimal and does not
include certain costs, described above, to hire an actuary or pay PBGC termination in-
surance premiums, which are incurred by defined benefit plans.
97. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (1982).
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butions. Fourth, employers would not be subject to the current
provisions in ERISA imposing withdrawal liability. Some
changes in the minimum funding standards would be necessary.
Special rules would be needed to facilitate the ability of a with-
drawing employer to spin off assets and liabilities into an indi-
vidual plan.
These are but two suggestions of methods to increase cover-
age. Adoption of either might provide a mechanism for portabil-
ity.98 The hardest part of developing policy options in this area
is the difficulty in identifying incentives. More creative study is
certainly needed.
A final disincentive to new plan formation is the frequency
with which Congress has changed the rules governing private
pensions. Although this disincentive's effects cannot be quanti-
fied, they certainly exist. Employers cannot undertake responsi-
ble business planning, even if they already have plans, if they
never know how Congress will change ERISA. A rational retire-
ment income policy can best be developed in an atmosphere of
calm, not frenzy. The more frequently legislative change occurs,
the more costly the administrative burden of those changes on
plans. Therefore, if the establishment of a national retirement
income policy is a serious objective, Congress must decide to
make no further piecemeal changes to ERISA or the Internal
Revenue Code until it develops and articulates a national policy.
Although that decision may have little short-run effect on ex-
panding coverage, its effect in the long run will be considerable.
Thus far, the coverage discussion has been limited to consider-
ation of how to increase the number of employers who have es-
tablished pension plans. But even among employers who have
established pension plans, a coverage problem exists for some
workers. These are, specifically, workers who have been excluded
from coverage under an existing plan. Although many people be-
lieve that an employer must cover all employees under its pen-
sion plan, that is not necessarily true.
As long as an employer's plan coverage is broad enough to
meet one of the tests under section 410(b) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, it can retain its tax-favored status.99 Specifically, a
plan has to cover either seventy percent or more of all employ-
ees, or eighty percent or more of all eligible employees if at least
seventy percent of all employees are eligible. For purposes of the
eighty percent test, employees who have not satisfied the mini-
98. Portability is discussed infra text accompanying notes 126-32.
99. 26 U.S.C. § 410(b) (1982).
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mum age and service requirements of the plan are not consid-
ered employees.
In addition, certain categories of employees may be excluded
in determining whether the plan meets these coverage tests of
the Internal Revenue Code.'00 The most substantial group that
may be excluded are employees covered under a collective bar-
gaining agreement, if there is evidence that good faith bargain-
ing over benefits occurred. Whether the union employees are ac-
tually covered under a separate plan is immaterial.
Although it is difficult to determine the number of uncovered
workers who are employed by companies with pension plans, it
is clear that some workers will not be covered unless Congress
requires that a plan cover all workers for it to enjoy favorable
tax treatment.
Solving the problem of coverage does not guarantee workers a
private pension to supplement social security. According to re-
cently published figures, about fifty-seven percent of all covered
nonagricultural workers have a vested right to benefits. 10' An
important goal of a national retirement policy, therefore, should
be to improve the likelihood that covered workers receive bene-
fits from their plans.10 2 Reaching this goal may require changes
involving the minimum participation 0 " and vesting rules of
ERISA, 104 and integration of private pension plans with social
security. 0 5
B. Increasing Participation
One strategy for increased participation ERISA's framers en-
visioned was to require that every worker be eligible to partici-
pate in the company's pension plan from the first day of hire.
Yet early versions of the Act, and the law itself, all established
attainment of age twenty-five and one year of service as the min-
imum participation standards.106 Congress was concerned that
the imposition of earlier standards would be too costly for em-
ployers to administer. This decision was based on statistical evi-
dence showing that work force turnover rates tend to stabilize
100. 26 U.S.C. § 410(b)(3) (1982).
101. New Survey Findings, supra note 69, at 4-5.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 117-25.
103. ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1982).
104. ERISA § 104, 29 U.S.C. § 1024 (1982).
105. See infra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.




In recent years, some have proposed lowering the participa-
tion age, and others have even suggested elimination of the min-
imum age. Although employers do not generally support such
proposals, the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA) lowered the
age to twenty-one, while retaining the one year of service re-
quirement. 08 Although it is too early to quantify with any de-
gree of precision the effect this change will have on ultimate
benefit delivery, some impact is certain.10 9 It is arguable that to
the extent that an employer without a pension plan has a partic-
ularly young work force, this change may serve as a disincentive
to plan formation.
Although Congress is unlikely to make any further changes
with respect to the age of participation, one issue not addressed
in REA was the one year of service rule. The statutory definition
is "a 12-month period during which the employee has not less
than 1000 hours of service."" 0 The statute also provides special
rules for seasonal"' and maritime" 2 industries. Although most
agree that the one-year rule is appropriate, Congress could alter-
natively consider a form of pro rata credit for part-time employ-
ees. For example, if an employee works between 501 and 1000
hours a year, that employee could be entitled to one-half a year
of service. In that way, employees who are permanent part-time
workers might be eligible for plan participation.
A related issue involves the extent to which use of the elapsed
time method, an alternative method for measuring years of ser-
vice, ought to be allowed. The elapsed time method uses
equivalencies instead of the actual counting of hours." 3 Under
this method, an employer looks at the total period of time that
elapses during the employee's period of employment. '4 Many
employers prefer to use this method because it does not require
tracking of actual hours of service, and thus is relatively easy to
107. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 605 (S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973)). See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION & LABOR, GENERAL
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, 93D CONG., 1ST SEss., ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF VESTING IN PENSION
PLANS (Comm. Print 1973).
108.. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 102(a)(1)(A), 98 Stat.
1426, 1426 (amending ERISA § 202(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(A) (1982)).
109. The Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) has published some prelimi-
nary data on this issue. See Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief, Impact of
the Retirement Equity Act, Feb. 1985, at 2.
110. ERISA § 202(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(3)(A) (1982).
111. ERISA § 202(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(3)(B) (1982).
112. ERISA § 202(a)(3)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(3)(D) (1982).
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.410(a)-7 (1980).
114. See supra note 30.
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administer. Yet, it is possible that a plan using the elapsed time
method could deny an employee with 1000 hours of service eligi-
bility for a year of service.""
Although codification of the current regulation permitting
elapsed time has been proposed to provide certainty for employ-
ers choosing to utilize it, this proposal has been controversial,
precisely because in certain circumstances employees might be
disadvantaged. If one goal of a national retirement policy is to
encourage the growth and maintenance of plans, the administra-
tive convenience of the elapsed time method must be weighed
against the possible inequities to workers. One policy option
would be to amend ERISA to codify the current elapsed time
rules, but provide that if a worker could prove that he or she
had at least 1000 hours of service, a year of service would be
credited.
A further policy issue in the area of participation and eligibil-
ity arises from the provision in ERISA allowing workers within
five years of normal retirement age to be excluded from partici-
pation in a plan.116 Originally included in ERISA to remove a
disincentive for employers to hire the older worker, the provi-
sion's current appropriateness is questionable, particularly if the
minimum vesting standards are lowered. If it is true that few
employers hire older workers anyway, it is hard to justify exclu-
sion of those who manage to gain employment. Yet, it is clear
that the cost of providing a pension for older workers with short
work careers is great. A compromise policy would be to repeal
the provision, while making clear that workers hired within five
years of normal retirement age must meet the minimum vesting
standards to qualify for benefits and that benefits would not au-
tomatically vest when workers reached age sixty-five. Moreover,
a special funding or accrual rule could be developed to ease the
employer's cost of providing the benefit.
C. Vesting Options
Most covered workers do not receive benefits because they
change jobs before they have worked long enough to vest. Vest-
ing refers to the time at which a worker's right to a benefit is
nonforfeitable, even if that worker terminates employment
115. See, e.g., H.R. 3071, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by Congressman John
Erlenborn (R-I11.) on May 19, 1983 (§ 1307).
116. ERISA § 202(a)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2)(B) (1982).
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before retirement. ERISA established three vesting options: ten
year cliff vesting, graded vesting beginning at twenty-five per-
cent vesting after five years and rising to 100% vesting after fif-
teen years, and the rule of 45, in which vesting is based on a
combination of age and service.1 7 Employers can choose any one
of the three vesting schedules, or, of course, can establish one
that is more generous. Most use ten year cliff vesting, because it
is the easiest to administer.
Employers generally regard pensions as a way to attract and
retain employees. Pensions were initially viewed as gratuitous
rewards for the faithful full-career employee. Consequently, em-
ployers used to require employees to work until retirement to be
eligible for benefits. ERISA ended that. But the current debate
over whether ERISA's vesting schedules should be shortened
has its roots in the fundamental tension between employment
policy and retirement income policy.11 8 On one hand, long vest-
ing periods disadvantage mobile workers, because these workers
are unlikely to qualify for benefits. On the other hand, shorter
vesting encourages mobility, and that rightly concerns employers
who depend on experienced workers to maintain productivity
and profitability.
Additionally, the debate over shorter vesting exposes the di-
vergent views of organized labor. Unions representing service
and professional employees, for whom turnover is common, gen-
erally support shorter vesting, while crafts unions generally do
not. The latter unions share the same concerns as the employers.
Both the union and the employer make a substantial investment
to train workers to perform a particular task, and shorter vesting
makes it easier for workers to leave the job before the employer
and the union have reaped the benefit of their respective invest-
ments. Longer vesting periods tie workers to their jobs, and
make them less likely to leave and work for competitors." 9
The first move to mandating shorter periods for vesting oc-
117. ERISA § 203(a)(2)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(3) (1982).
118. For a discussion of this issue, see Munnell, supra note 12, at 64-65.
119. Arguably, where one stands on the question of whether ERISA's vesting stan-
dards should be changed is a function of whether one believes that the law should con-
form to the reality of work force behavior or that work force behavior must conform to
the law. In other words, some people believe that the vesting standards ought to remain
as they are. They believe that to lower the current standards would encourage worker
mobility which, from a business point of view, they argue is unsound labor policy. Others
argue that, as a matter of pension policy, if Congress's aim is to improve benefit delivery
then it makes sense to lower the current standards in recognition of the reality of the
workplace, namely, that many workers do not remain on the job long enough to earn
benefits under the current vesting rules.
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curred in 1982 when Congress enacted the Tax Equity and Fis-
cal Responsibility Act (TEFRA), which prescribed more strin-
gent vesting rules for "top-heavy" plans.120 Congress defined
top-heavy plans as those in which at least sixty percent of the
accrued benefits or aggregate of the account balances under the
plan belong to key employees.1 21 A top-heavy plan must satisfy
special rules, including providing for faster vesting and a mini-
mum nonintegrated benefit. Top-heavy plans must either pro-
vide 100% vesting after three years, or six-year graded vest-
ing.1 22 These rules became effective for plan years beginning
after December 31, 1983.
Prior to TEFRA, the Carter Commission had urged voluntary
movement to shorter vesting schedules. Although many had
urged the Commission to endorse five-year vesting, the Commis-
sion did not do so, in part because no universal system for porta-
bility of vested benefits exists. The Commission recognized that
shortening the period for vesting would enable more workers to
become vested, thus increasing the likelihood that short service
mobile workers would receive small benefit amounts. Those
amounts would most probably be consumed currently, rather
than saved for retirement, and the Commission opposed the use
of vested pensions for that purpose.
1 23
From a retirement income security point of view, the Commis-
sion's logic was sound, given the then current state of the law.
Practically speaking, however, because most small pension plans
are now required to provide faster vesting under the top-heavy
rules, it is time for Congress to reexamine the issue of faster
vesting at the same time that it addresses the need for portabil-
ity of vested benefits.
Each of the last two Congresses has considered amending
ERISA to require five-year vesting.124 Legislators have also dis-
cussed the possibility of 100% vesting after three years, coupled
with an age twenty-one and one year of service rule. Were Con-
120. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 240, 96 Stat. 324, 514-20.
121. 26 U.S.C.A. § 416(i)(1) (West Supp. 1985). The term "key employee" was origi-
nally defined in § 240(a) of TEFRA. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
369, § 524(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 872, however, changed the definition of key employee to
exclude officers who earn less than one and a half times the dollar limit on contributions
under a defined contribution plan. For 1984, the limit was $45,000.
122. 26 U.S.C. § 416(g)(1)(A) (1982).
123. PRES. COMM'N REP., supra note 15, at 45.
124. See, e.g., H.R. 3396, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by Congressman Claude
Pepper (D-Fla.) on May 1, 1981 (§ 1101); 130 CONG. REc. E4378 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1984)
(remarks of Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro (D-N.Y.)).
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gress to change the current ERISA vesting rules, a threshold
policy decision it would face is whether more than one vesting
option ought to be continued or whether a single vesting sched-
ule ought to be mandated. Although the latter would be simpler,
the flexibility of the former makes it more politically advanta-




Shortening the period for vesting would result in greater num-
bers of workers eligible for benefits but, by itself, would not nec-
essarily result in greater retirement income security. To the ex-
tent that employers may distribute benefits to employees upon
termination of employment, or to survivors of a deceased em-
ployee, or that employees choose to receive their vested benefits
in a lump sum prior to retirement, there is little assurance that
these vested benefits will be saved for retirement. In fact, ac-
cording to recent statistics from the Employee Benefit Research
Institute, of the 6.6 million workers who reported having re-
ceived lump-sum distributions from a prior job, only 4.4% said
they used the money for retirement.126 A national retirement in-
come policy must recognize this fact, and accordingly assure that
vested benefits are used to provide income for retirement rather
than for current consumption.
One way to achieve this goal would be to establish a universal
portability system into which all lump-sum distributions from a
plan prior to retirement would be channeled. Much has been
written about the types of portability and the problems of set-
ting up systems to accommodate these various types.127 A cen-
tral portability clearinghouse was part of an early pension re-
form bill the Senate passed, but debate focused on whether
participation in this clearinghouse should be mandatory or
voluntary.
28
If Congress is serious about establishing a national retirement
125. If a worker does not vest, the benefit amounts attributable to his or her service
are forfeited. Those forfeitures stay in the plan and, in the case of a defined benefit plan,
are used to reduce future employer contributions. To the extent that more workers vest,
forfeitures decrease, and employer costs thus increase.
126. See Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief, The World of Pensions
Ten Years After ERISA, Sept. 1984, at 19 (Table 10).
127. See generally E. MEIER & P. BAssErr, supra note 17.
128. Id. at 39.
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policy that will result in employer-provided pensions to supple-
ment social security, any lump-sum distributions from tax-fa-
vored plans must be rolled over into a portability account."2 9
This account must accept all types of pension distributions, in-
cluding those consisting of employee contributions as well as
employer contributions.130 In addition, because workers in our
voluntary pension system often move from covered to uncovered
employment, the portability account should be designed so that
direct employee contributions, and any employer matching con-
tributions, may be made as part of a national plan to increase
coverage.
Moreover, financial institutions across the country should be
able to offer these accounts, thus encouraging competition. Em-
ployees who move should be free to leave their portability ac-
counts where they are, or ask the financial institution to transfer
their account to a financial institution in their new location.
Distributions from this portability account should be made as
an annuity. Some consideration should be given as to whether
any form of distribution from this account other than an annu-
ity should be permitted. Assuming, however, that strong policy
reasons exist to permit lump-sum distributions earlier than re-
tirement age in cases of real hardship-such as serious illness
that results in large uninsured medical bills 1 3-any other lump-
sum distributions should be discouraged by the application of a
stiff excise tax.
132
This type of portability system, maintained by financial insti-
tutions, offers several advantages. First, it increases the likeli-
hood that retirement benefits are used during retirement years
and not before. Second, it maintains the current flexibility of
employers to cash out employees or survivors whose benefit
amounts are small while providing a mechanism for employees
to accumulate retirement funds. Third, it provides a stream of
retirement income. Fourth, because the portability mechanism
proposed is not federally controlled, but is a special type of plan
sponsored by a financial institution, it avoids criticism sug-
gesting that a new federal bureaucracy needlessly duplicative of
129. See SEN. AGING PRINT, supra note 3, at 134 (essay of Donald S. Grubbs, Jr.).
130. Under the current law, employee contributions may not generally be rolled over
into an IRA. 26 U.S.C. § 402(a)(5)(B), (E) (1982).
131. Because money in portability accounts is intended to be retirement income, dis-
tributions for the purposes of purchase of a residence or college expenses for a dependent
should not qualify for any hardship test, and should certainly be subject to a substan-
tially higher excise tax than distributions for other reasons.
132. The current excise tax is 10%. 26 U.S.C. § 408(f)(1) (1982).
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social security is being created.
Devising a portability system that is both feasible and attrac-
tive is difficult. A national retirement income policy, though,
must address the issue of portability and present a proposal for
a workable system for handling this issue.
IV. ALTERNATIVES FOR PLANS AND COVERAGE
Once Congress has formulated a national retirement income
policy, it will need to consider what the best way to implement
that policy might be. Three structural approaches are possible.
Congress could either redesign the current social security pro-
gram to provide an adequate retirement income for all workers,
or establish a second advance-funded tier to provide additional
retirement income. The second tier could be mandatory, and
could have an opt-out feature so that employers who wanted to
provide at least the same level of retirement income through an-
other retirement system could do so. This approach, of course, is
similar to the retirement system in the United Kingdom.1 33
On the other hand, a combination of governmental and pri-
vate sources could provide retirement income. Social security
would remain the basic floor, but other programs would supple-
ment it. The total retirement income provided would be the
same as under an expanded social security system. Instead of an
expanding federal role, however, this approach would seek to
forge a partnership between public and private retirement sys-
tems that shared the final goal of providing adequate retirement
133. Retirement income for citizens of the United Kingdom is provided through a
composite system of social security and private pensions. In a report published during
World War II, Lord Beveridge proposed the first comprehensive national plan for pro-
viding retirement benefits. The Beveridge Report called for a contributory social security
system that would provide basic subsistence level benefits for all citizens and permit
private sector plans to supplement that basic benefit.
This general approach was adopted in the National Insurance Act of 1946, which took
effect in 1948. The Act established a flat benefit, regardless of income, funded by a uni-
form contribution from all employees. No provision for cost-of-living adjustments was
made.
In 1959, a second layer of protection was added which took the form of an earnings-
related graduated old-age benefit. The first layer was designed to provide a minimum-
income floor, while the new second layer was designed to provide higher benefits through
an earnings- and service-related formula. An individual employer could "contract out" or
"opt out" of this earnings-related layer and cover its workers under a company plan
("occupational scheme") provided that the plan met certain financial and benefit stand-
ards. For a fuller discussion of the United Kingdom approach, see generally M. HoRLICK
& A. SKOLNICK, MANDATING PRIVATE PENSIONS: A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
60-82 (1977).
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income.1 -4 If this latter approach continues to prevail, Congress
will need to decide how defined benefit, defined contribution,
capital accumulation plans, and Individual Retirement Accounts
will help to assure each worker of an adequate retirement
income.
A. Defined Benefit Plans and Defined Contribution Plans
One of the most frequently discussed issues today is the trend
away from the traditional method of providing retirement in-
come through a defined benefit pension plan.3 5 In recent years,
the number of defined contribution plans' 36 has grown at a much
faster rate than the number of defined benefit plans.137 In part,
that growth represents an increase in the number of supplemen-
tal plans. Many employers establish defined contribution plans
to supplement the retirement benefits defined benefit plans pro-
vide their employees. The growth of defined contribution plans,
however, also represents a trend toward reliance on these ar-
rangements as the primary source of retirement income for em-
134. For purposes of this Article, I have assumed that the approach that will con-
tinue to prevail is the provision of retirement income from a combination of sources. The
fundamental question of which approach should prevail must be addressed before any of
the other policy issues can be resolved.
135. A defined benefit plan, ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1982), provides a
fixed level of benefits upon retirement, usually based on a formula related to salary and/
or years of service. Employers who sponsor defined benefit plans are required to provide
the promised benefits.
136. A defined contribution plan, ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1982), is an
individual account plan. Upon retirement, a worker is entitled only to the account bal-
ance, not a fixed level of benefits. Employers who sponsor defined contribution plans are
only required to make the agreed-upon contributions to the workers' accounts. The most
common types of defined contribution plans are profit-sharing plans, employee stock
ownership plans (ESOPs) and cash or deferred arrangements (also called "401(k) plans,"
named for the section of the Internal Revenue Code that authorizes them) which are
operated in conjunction with profit-sharing plans.
137. According to the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI), which analyzed
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) published data, the creation rates for both types of plans
slowed in 1983 to 6.8% growth for defined contribution plans (DCs) and 4.7% for de-







Employee Benefit Research Institute Notes, May/June 1984,
at 8, Table 1.
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ployees. For several reasons, defined contribution plans provide
far less retirement income security for employees than defined
benefit plans.
First, with a defined contribution plan, the risk of loss for
poor investment performance falls on the participant, not the
employer. Second, because the participant in a defined contribu-
tion plan receives benefits based on the value of the account at
the time of retirement, and because that value fluctuates accord-
ing to the return on the investments of the fund, it is impossible
to predict accurately the purchasing power of that balance at
retirement. Unlike defined benefit plans, which can be targeted
to replace a certain level of preretirement earnings because they
provide a fixed level of benefits upon retirement, 13 8 most defined
contribution plans only distribute benefits in a lump sum. Plan
participants may or may not choose to use that money to pro-
vide retirement income. Third, defined contribution plans are
prospective only. They do not provide a way for an employer to
credit service performed before the plan is adopted. This partic-
ularly disadvantages workers who are older when a company
adopts its defined contribution plan. Finally, because benefits
are paid in a lump sum, they cannot be protected from the fu-
ture effects of inflation. Congress has expressed a clear prefer-
ence that employee benefit plans pay benefits as an annuity, so
that a stream of benefits during retirement is assured.139 Lump-
sum distributions, which are the normal form of benefits for
most defined contribution plans, clearly conflict with this policy.
In response to the foregoing considerations, some have sug-
gested that Congress act to reverse the apparent trend toward
defined contribution plans by adopting policies that encourage
the adoption and maintenance of defined benefit plans and re-
duce the attractiveness of defined contribution plans. Undoubt-
edly, defined benefit plans provide the best assurance of retire-
ment income security for most workers, but defined contribution
plans could still be encouraged to provide an adequate benefit
for full-career workers who begin accruing benefits under the
plan at an early age.
If Congress wants to assure greater retirement income security
for workers under defined contribution plans, several options ex-
138. Most defined benefit formulas are tied to pay, such as career average pay or final
average pay over a fixed period of time, usually three or five years. Defined benefit plans
for union workers often express the benefit in terms of a flat dollar amount per year of
service.
139. See, e.g., Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 103, 98 Stat.
1426, 1429-33 (amending ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1982)).
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ist. First, Congress could require defined contribution plans to
provide benefits in the form of a monthly annuity payable at
retirement age. Alternatively, Congress could require that if ben-
efits are distributed in a lump sum prior to retirement, they
must be rolled over into an Individual Retirement Account
(IRA) or into some other pension plan. Of course, Congress
could simply prohibit distributions from any qualified plan prior
to the participant's retirement. Adoption of any of these propos-
als would make it more likely that benefits are used for
retirement.
B. Retirement Plans v. Capital Accumulation Plans
The preceding discussion of defined benefit and defined con-
tribution plans assumes that Congress will decide that both
types of plans should be retirement plans. One reason Congress
might make such a decision is the attention that has been given
to the tax expenditures and revenue loss resulting from the
favorable tax treatment accorded employee benefit plans. 140 The
Department of Treasury has proposed many changes in this area
as part of its overall tax simplification plan."" The underlying
rationale for the proposed employee benefit changes is to make
the system more equitable. To the extent that tax incentives are
provided, they ought to go to plans that truly provide retirement
income. This would improve the likelihood that benefits are
used for retirement.
Rather than force all defined contribution plans to be true re-
tirement plans, however, Congress might decide to draw some
distinctions between plans based on the purpose of the plan. For
example, many defined contribution plans are not adopted by
employers to provide retirement benefits for their employees. In-
stead, they are arrangements designed to facilitate capital ac-
cumulation or savings. Because a savings component is the third
leg of the metaphorical three-legged stool of retirement income,
encouraging the adoption of employer-sponsored capital ac-
cumulation plans would be consistent with a national retirement
140. Employer contributions to qualified pension plans are deductible under 26
U.S.C. § 404(a) (1982) up to the limits prescribed in 26 U.S.C. § 415 (1982). Those con-
tributions are not taxable to the employee on whose behalf they have been made until
the retirement benefits are distributed to the employee. Finally, any income earned by
the pension trust is exempt from taxation.
141. 2 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 336-58 (Nov.
1984) (Treasury Dep't Rep. to the President) [hereinafter cited as TREAS. PLAN].
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income policy. Among defined contribution plans with the goal
of capital accumulation, the question arises of when the accumu-
lated capital is to be consumed. Congress could distinguish be-
tween savings plans providing for retirement savings and savings
plans providing for other types of savings, such as home
purchase, financing of college education, or financing for other
types of consumption. Although none of these latter savings
goals are undesirable, they are not savings for retirement and
therefore should not be encouraged through tax incentives for
qualified plans.
If Congress were to distinguish between plans based on their
purpose, certain changes in ERISA would be desirable. For in-
stance, retirement plans should be subject to stricter distribu-
tion rules so as to assure payment of retirement income. Capital
accumulation plans designed to provide savings for retirement
should be subject to similar restrictions, but should be entitled
to the same tax benefits as retirement plans. On the other hand,
employers could establish other types of capital accumulation
plans that would not be given the same favorable tax treatment
because they contain features, such as provisions permitting in-
service distributions or distributions prior to retirement, that
make them unlikely to provide retirement income.
Employers would thus retain the flexibility they enjoy under
the current law to establish whatever plans meet their needs. To
the extent that plans they establish provide retirement income
or retirement savings, the plans should receive the same
favorable tax treatment available today.
C. Individual Retirement Accounts
Originally established in ERISA as a source of retirement in-
come for workers not otherwise covered under employer-spon-
sored plans, individual retirement accounts (IRAs) are an impor-
tant, yet troubling, new addition to the retirement income that
social security and private pensions provide. The expanded
availability of IRAs to all workers, regardless of pension plan
coverage, introduced by the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act
(ERTA), 42 has led to a boom in IRA formation accompanied by
142. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2002, 88
Stat. 829, 958-71, added two new sections to the Internal Revenue Code: I.R.C. § 408
created the IRA and I.R.C. § 219 authorized a deduction for contributions to an IRA. As
originally enacted, the IRA was only available to individuals who were not active partici-
pants in any other plans and the deduction was limited to the lesser of 15% of compen-
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staggering revenue losses. 143 For several policy reasons, many
have been concerned about the growth of IRAs.
First, unlike pension plans that may not discriminate in favor
of the highly compensated with respect to benefits or contribu-
tions, the universal availability of IRAs makes their utilization
highly discriminatory. Not surprisingly, recent data show that
IRA usage increases with income level. Nearly forty percent of
all workers earning $30,000 to $40,000 and nearly fifty-eight per-
cent of all workers earning above $50,000 have IRAs, in compari-
son to use of IRAs by only eleven percent of workers earning
between $10,000 and $15,000 and only seventeen percent of
workers earning between $15,000 and $20,000."4 Because the
likelihood of coverage under pension plans is closely tied to in-
come level, the percentage of workers covered by both IRAs and
employer-sponsored plans is significantly higher among upper
income levels.""'
From a policy perspective, given the foregoing statistics, the
question must be asked: Is the IRA truly effective in broadening
coverage, or is it merely a tax-favored form of savings that pro-
vides an additional way for individuals already possessing a sup-
plement to social security to increase their potential retirement
income?
If the IRA has not been effective in broadening coverage and
is perceived as merely a tax shelter for the middle and upper
class, several options are possible. One is to return to the basic
concept of IRAs, with some modification. IRAs could be re-
stricted to workers not vested in any other plan, and to vested
workers whose employer-provided contributions are less than
the IRA contribution limits. Although this poses some valuation
problems for defined benefit plans, it addresses the concern that
IRAs ought not be used to provide tax-favored benefits to work-
ers who are already likely to have sufficient retirement income.
Another policy option addresses the concern that those most
in need of IRAs to supplement other sources of retirement in-
come are the least likely to have them. Tax treatment of IRA
contributions could be changed to make the IRA more attractive
sation or $1500 (I.R.C. § 219(b)). The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 allowed even
active participants in employer-sponsored plans to deduct up to the lesser of 100% of
compensation or $2000 ($2,250 for spousal IRAs) for tax years beginning after 1981.
143. See Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief, Individual Retirement Ac-
counts: Characteristics and Policy Implications, July 1984, at 5 (Table 2). The revenue
loss in 1982, the first year of universal IRAs, was $28.4 billion, compared to $4.8 billion
in 1981.
144. Id. at 6 (Table 3).
145. Id. at 18 (Table 8).
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to lower paid workers by utilizing a tax credit, rather than a tax
deduction. In addition, the credit could be phased out over a
certain income level, to solve the problem of the lack of discrimi-
nation standards for IRAs.
Second, there is substantial disagreement over the role of
IRAs in providing retirement income. Some argue that the ten
percent excise tax146 is little disincentive to early withdrawal of
IRA funds. Thus, the IRA is not very likely to be used for retire-
ment. Conceding that IRAs should actually be used for retire-
ment, several options with respect to enforcement exist. For ex-
ample, stiffer excise tax penalties could be imposed for
withdrawal prior to retirement age 147 or distributions from IRAs
could only be made as an annuity.
V. INTEGRATION OF PRIVATE PENSIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY
Perhaps the most highly charged issue to be addressed in
fashioning a national retirement income policy is the question of
whether, and to what extent, integration of private pension ben-
efits with social security should be permitted. It would be impos-
sible in this Article to discuss fully the history of integration and
all the arguments for and against it. 48 Instead, this Section will
focus on the basic theory of integration, and some of the policy
options that have been advanced to redress certain inequities in
the current rules.
Because social security covers virtually all the private sector
work force, most pension plans are designed to supplement so-
cial security. Since the early 1940's, the IRS has sanctioned the
practice of specifically correlating the benefit formula under the
plan to the benefits received under social security.14 9 This prac-
tice, called social security integration, permits employers to re-
verse the tilt of social security toward the lower income workers
by providing greater benefits under the plan to higher income
workers. e50 Because integration appears to offend the normal
146. 26 U.S.C. § 408(f)(1) (1982).
147. The Treasury has proposed raising the excise tax on distributions occurring
before the individual's death, disability, or the attainment of age 591/ to 20%, except
that if the distribution is used to pay for a dependent's college education or the purchase
of the individual's first principal residence, the excise tax would remain at 10%. TREAS.
PLAN, supra note 141, at 343.
148. See generally J. SCHULZ & T. Lmvrrr, PENSION INTEGRATION: CONCEPTS, ISSUES
AND PROPOSALS (1983).
149. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(5) (1982).
150. In a nonintegrated plan, the same benefit formula, such as percentage of pay or
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rules prohibiting discrimination in favor of the highly compen-
sated, it is important to note that integrated plans must comply
with complicated Internal Revenue Service rules. 151 These rules
are designed to permit only a limited amount of directing plan
benefits toward the highly compensated as a counterbalance to
the social security tilt.
The theory upon which integration is based is that employers
should set uniform replacement rate targets for their employees.
To the extent that social security replaces a portion of that tar-
get, employers should be able to lower the percentage of benefit
provided under the pension plan. Otherwise, employers argue, to
provide an adequate replacement rate for higher paid employ-
ees, lower paid employees might receive more than 100% of
their preretirement pay.
For example, suppose an employer decides that a reasonable
retirement income replacement goal is sixty percent of preretire-
ment career average pay. If, for a worker with a $10,000 career
average, social security provides a fifty percent replacement rate,
the employer's plan need only provide ten percent. Similarly, if,
for a worker with a $100,000 career average, social security only
provides thirty percent replacement, the plan could provide an
additional thirty percent. It is thus apparent that the basic pre-
mise of integration-the need for a uniform replacement rate
across all salary levels-is flawed. Even accepting that premise
and the theory of integration, the practical effect of the current
rules is that some workers may be "integrated out" of their en-
tire plan benefit, depending on the type and level of integration
chosen. Those most likely to fall into this category are low-in-
come workers, although some higher paid workers with short pe-
riods of service may also suffer.
No single definitive study shows the number and types of
plans that are integrated. Studies, though, suggest that more
than half, and perhaps as many as seventy percent, of all plans
are integrated. 15 2 The two major types of integrated plans are
excess plans and offset plans. Excess plans generally provide for
benefits only with respect to compensation above a specified
dollar amount per year, applies to all workers, regardless of what they might receive from
social security.
151. The integration rules are not set out in either ERISA itself or the Internal Reve-
nue Code. Rather they are derived from revenue rulings issued under the authority of 26
U.S.C. § 401(a) (1982). The most commonly relied on is Rev. Rul. 446, 1971-2 C.B. 187.
152. See R. SCHMITr, INTEGRATED PENSION PLANS: AN ANALYSIS OF EARNINGS REPLACE-
MENT 2 (1981) (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress); J. SCHULZ & T.
LEAvITT, supra note 148, at 24-35.
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level. The integration level in pure excess plans is usually the
social security taxable wage base. Thus, in this type of plan,
vested workers who earn below the taxable wage base ($39,000 in
1985) will get no benefit from .their pension plan. Only vested
workers earning above that base will obtain a benefit to supple-
ment social security.
A variant of the pure excess plan is the step rate excess plan.
Unlike the pure excess plan with a wage base integration level,
the step rate plan provides a benefit to all workers, although
earnings above the integration level may have a greater accrual
rate.'53
Offset plans, by contrast, provide for uniform accrual rates
across all salary levels, but reduce the pension benefit by a por-
tion of the social security benefit. Although legally an offset plan
may only subtract 831/3 % of the primary social security benefit,
it is possible even under an offset plan for a worker to wind up
with no private pension benefit.6 4 The policy debate over inte-
gration focuses on at least three questions: should integration be
banned completely?; if integration is allowed, should the rules
be changed so that all workers will get at least some pension
benefit?; and if the rules are changed, what should they be?
The debate over whether the practice of integration should be
retained or eliminated usually amounts to a debate over whether
integration currently causes under-pensioning for lower income
workers, or whether the elimination of integration will cause
over-pensioning of lower income workers. Proponents of integra-
tion argue that, without integration, it is difficult to design a
plan that provides adequate retirement income to the higher
paid without providing 100% or more of preretirement income
to the lower paid. In addition, they argue that only a small per-
centage of workers will receive no pension benefits from inte-
grated plans, and that, because TEFRA required top-heavy
plans to provide a minimum nonintegrated benefit, small inte-
153. J. SCHULZ & T. LEAVITT, supra note 148, at 16-17.
154. In a typical offset plan, the benefit formula provides that the pension may be
reduced by 50% of the primary insurance amount under social security. The following
example using that approach appears in a booklet the Pension Rights Center published.
A hypothetical employee earning $15,000 per year or $1250 per month with 10 years of
service is about to retire. Assume that his or her earnings have been level for the entire
period of employment. The plan benefit is equal to 1.5% of the highest five years of
average monthly earnings times years of service. The benefit under the plan would be
$187.50 (1.5% x $1250 x 10). Given that earnings history, the social security benefit
would probably be about $544 per month. Applying the 50% offset, half of $544 would
then be subtracted from the pension benefit ($187.50 minus $272). The employee thus
would be entitled to no benefit at all under the pension plan. PENSION RIGHTS CENTER,
THE CASE OF THE DISAPPEARING PENSION 5 (1984).
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grated plans are no longer the serious problem they once were.
Opponents of integration argue that no one could live on social
security alone, and if employer-provided pensions are designed
to provide the second leg of the retirement income stool, em-
ployers should not be allowed to use one leg, social security, to
reduce the need for another leg, pensions. In addition, they ar-
gue that higher earners are more likely to have the third leg,
savings and investments, than lower earners, and that a higher
replacement rate for low earners is necessary to provide ade-
quate retirement income.
The political process will ultimately resolve this debate. If the
second two questions described above are answered to the satis-
faction of the opponents of integration, the practice of integra-
tion is likely to survive. The new rules, though, will be very dif-
ferent from the old.
The second issue, whether the integration rules should be
changed so that every worker will receive at least some benefit
from the employer-provided plan, is fairly easy to settle. If there
is a need for benefits to supplement social security, and most
agree that there is, then no employer should be allowed to estab-
lish a tax-favored plan that provides no benefit to lower paid
workers.
The third issue, how to structure the rules to provide more
equitable treatment for lower income workers, is the most diffi-
cult to resolve. Over the years, various proposals for change have
surfaced. 155 Each represents some improvement over the current
system, but some have lacked what many identify as a funda-
mental tenet of any change in this area, which is simplicity. Be-
cause the current rules are far too complicated, they are difficult
to explain or police. Therefore, simplification of the rules is a
critical policy goal.
Previous proposals have focused primarily on two approaches:
a minimum benefit concept, and "tinkering" with the current
system by narrowing the difference between the benefits pro-
vided the higher and lower paid employees. Both approaches
eliminate the possibility of integrating out workers from any
benefit under the plan.
The minimum benefit concept, as utilized in the current top-
heavy rules, is the simplest to understand and administer. It
guarantees a nonintegrated floor of benefits for each worker, and
155. See id. at 14-15. See also Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief, Pro-
posed Changes in Pension Integration Could Lead to Inefficient Policies and Reduced
Private Pension Coverage, Feb. 1983, at 8.
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preserves an employer's current ability to integrate the plan
above the level of the minimum benefit. Commentators criticize
this approach for at least two reasons. First, the approach does
not necessarily assure adequate retirement income for all work-
ers. Employers that want to avoid the cost of the minimum ben-
efit could convert their integrated plan into a less generous
nonintegrated one. For instance, if a formula similar to the top-
heavy one were applied to all integrated non-top-heavy plans,
any employer wanting to avoid the two percent of pay rule515
could establish a nonintegrated plan providing for one percent
of pay. The obvious response to this criticism would be to pro-
vide a minimum benefit across the board for all plans, although
that solution would impose substantial costs on many employ-
ers, and would perhaps lead to plan terminations.
Second, a minimum benefit approach is likely to be more
costly for defined benefit plans than defined contribution plans,
thus accelerating the trend toward defined contribution plans.
The effect of a front-loaded minimum benefit formula such as
that used in the top-heavy rules is to provide disproportionately
large benefits to short service workers. Although that was the
method used to redirect the benefits in a top-heavy plan to the
lower paid workers,'5 7 it is not clear that in the context of an
overall retirement income policy it would be desirable to reward
short service workers at the expense of full career workers.
The second approach would tinker with the current rules to
make them more equitable. The 1978 Carter proposal embodied
this approach, 58 as did the 1981 Erlenborn proposal,'159 and the
1982 Rangel proposal'60 which set the stage for the adoption of
156. 26 U.S.C. § 416(c)(1)(B) (1982).
157. A top-heavy defined benefit plan must provide a minimum benefit equal to two
percent of compensation per year of service, up to 20% of compensation. 26 U.S.C.
§ 416(c)(1) (1982). Thus, 20% of the worker's total benefit is accrued in the first 10
years of service. Some have called forcing faster accrual in the earliest years of service
"frontloading." Although ERISA limits an employer's ability to "backload" benefits by
providing for a faster accrual rate after an employee reaches a specified age or years of
service, frontloading is permissible. One of the reasons that Congress forced top-heavy
plans to frontload benefits was that the plans discriminated in favor of the highly com-
pensated with respect to benefits.
158. This is also called the Halperin proposal, named for the former Assistant Secre-
tary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, Daniel I. Halperin. It was part of President Carter's
1978 tax proposal and initially incorporated in § 251 of H.R. 12,078, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978). For a full discussion of this proposal and its history, see J. SCHULZ & T. LEAvrrr,
supra note 148, at 53-57.
159. This proposal appeared as § 4811 of H.R. 4330, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced
on July 30, 1981 by Congressman John Erlenborn (R-Ill.). Senator Don Nickles (R-Okla.)
introduced a similar bill, S. 1541, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
160. See 128 CONG. REc. H2353 (daily ed. May 19, 1982) (remarks of Congressman
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the top-heavy rules. These proposals reflect several policy
choices. The Carter proposal introduced the concept of a ratio
for step rate plans. Benefits or contributions above the integra-
tion level could not exceed benefits or contributions below that
level by a ratio of 2:1.161 For offset plans, the percentage of social
security that was offset could be no greater than the percentage
of pay in the plan's benefit formula. For instance, in a plan pro-
viding fifty percent of final average pay, no more than fifty per-
cent of the primary social security benefit could be offset. Al-
though this proposal originally generated a groundswell of
opposition from the business community, many believe today
that this approach is sound and merits Congress's serious con-
sideration."'2 The Erlenborn proposal was similar to the Carter
proposal, but introduced a new element: a target replacement
rate with a minimum of fifty percent of preretirement earnings
for the lower paid workers, and a total cap of eighty percent for
all workers."' 3
The Rangel proposal was the most complicated of the three,
but restricted the amount of the benefit subject to reduction to
the annual benefit that could be purchased with the share of the
social security tax paid by the employer providing the pension.
This proposal was an attempt to limit the "credit" an employer
could get for the employee's social security benefit to that por-
tion of the benefit that was "bought" with the employer's own
payroll tax contributions.'"
In fashioning a national retirement income policy, some
changes in the current rules governing integration are necessary.
At minimum, pure excess plans and offset plans that provide no
benefits to lower paid workers should be outlawed. A much sim-
pler and more equitable set of rules limiting the ability of em-
ployers to reverse the tilt in social security toward lower paid
workers is clearly desirable. If changes can be made to eliminate
the inequities and reduce the potential for abuse, there will be
less need to abolish the practice of formally integrating private
pensions with social security.
Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.)). Section 4 of H.R. 6410, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) contained
the integration proposal.
161. The original proposal, supra note 158, called for a ratio of 1.8 to 1. The proposal
was subsequently changed to require a 2:1 ratio. See J. SCHULZ & T. LEAvrrr, supra note
148, at 53 n.2.
162. Cynics point out that one of the key reasons that this approach is more politi-
cally viable today is the enactment of the top-heavy rules that are far more costly and
difficult to administer than this proposal.
163. J. SCHULZ & T. LEAVTT, supra note 148, at 58-59.
164. Id. at 59-60.
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VI. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPING A NATIONAL POLICY
Many other issues exist that should be addressed in the con-
text of developing a national retirement income policy. Each de-
serves attention and study, and could easily be the subject of a
separate Article if given the treatment deserved. This Article's
cursory mention of them should not be interpreted to mean that
they are unimportant. Rather, this Article identifies them as
areas requiring more consideration at a later date.
Chief among the issues that this Article has not addressed is
the investment of pension plan assets. With plan assets pro-
jected to be in excess of one trillion dollars,1 5 policymakers
must address the fundamental questions of ownership and con-
trol. How these assets are invested, how investment decisions are
made, who makes the decisions, and what factors they consider,
are but a few of the questions that need to be explored. Various
legislative proposals suggest channeling investment towards a
particular type of investment166 or away from a particular type
of investment. 6 7 Another growing area of concern is the use of
pension assets in the corporate takeover context. The develop-
ment of a national retirement income policy must include care-
ful consideration of investment-related issues.
Among the other areas requiring policy development are plan
termination issues, including the need for reform in the single-
employer plan area, and questions relating to the termination of
so-called overfunded plans that result in a reversion of assets to
the employer; the desirability of federal reporting, disclosure,
and fiduciary standards for state and local pension plans; reex-
amination of the exclusion of governmental and church plans
from ERISA's rules; and analysis of the effect of ERISA's broad
preemption language on various aspects of worker rights and
protections that would otherwise be handled under state law.
165. H. GRAY, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE INVESTMENT AND CONTROL OF PENSION FUNDS 7
(1983).
166. For example, H.R. 4243, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by Congressman Ron
Wyden (D-Or.) on Oct. 27, 1983, and H.R. 1179, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by
Congressman John Erlenborn (R-Ill.) on Feb. 2, 1983, were designed to encourage greater
pension plan investment in residential mortgages.
167. On Feb. 4, 1985, Congressman Augustus Hawkins (D-Cal.) introduced H.R. 925,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., requiring each pension plan to report its investments in South
Africa to the Secretary of Labor through a new separate schedule attached to Form 5500.
Presumably, once disclosure of these holdings is made, pressure will be exerted on the
plan to cease investing in companies doing business in South Africa.
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CONCLUSION
The lack of a rational and coherent national retirement in-
come policy has caused conflicting legislative and regulatory sig-
nals and goals. The most efficient way to assure adoption of a
single, consistent set of goals would be to consolidate all poli-
cyrnaking, administrative, regulatory, and enforcement functions
relating to all types of retirement income sources-public and
private-in an executive branch agency, and consolidate all leg-
islative and oversight functions with respect to the same sources
in a congressional committee.
Because neither of these consolidations is likely to occur in
the near future, it is particularly important that one component
of retirement income security, namely employer-provided pri-
vate pensions, be treated consistently through the development
of a national retirement income policy for private pension plans.
This Article has identified many of the problems and policy op-
tions involved in the formulation of such a policy. Retirement
income goals must be set, and each legislative enactment and
regulatory proposal must move us toward the attainment of
these goals. American workers and society are entitled to no less.
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